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1 Introduction
Auctions in which bidders have crossholdings in other bidderssurplus are very
frequent in practice, as there are many cases that resemble a contest with hor-
izontal crossholdings. For instance, it is usual in some markets for competing
rms to hold shares in one other, or for an important proportion of a companys
ownership to belong to non-controller block shareholders, which in turn also hold
a controlling stake in a rival company.1
Unlike the standard auctions, the presence of horizontal crossholdings introduces
counter-value incentives on bidders because they get a payo¤ not only when they
win, but also when they lose the auction. Since the loser bidder appropriates
a proportion of the winning surplus, he cares about the valuation and the price
paid by the winner bidder. Thus, losing transforms the bidder into a minority
buyer, which induces a less aggressive bidding behavior from him. That is, the
incentive to lose counteracts the natural bidders incentives to raise his bid in
order to obtain the object.
The previous literature has studied this kind of auction in a framework where
signals are independently distributed and values may be interdependent. This
literature has shown that the less aggressive bidding behavior induced by horizon-
tal toeholds produces the classical result of revenue equivalence between standard
auctions (Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981)) no longer holding, even
when bidders have symmetric crossholdings. A seller interested in maximizing
her expected revenue should therefore not be indi¤erent with respect to the mech-
anism used to assign the object. Consequently, design of an optimal selling
mechanism should be a very relevant question for her.
In this paper, we address this question and characterize the optimal selling mech-
anism in the presence of horizontal crossholdings. To this end, we follow the
mechanism design methodology introduced by Myerson (1981) in a setup with
independent private values and independently distributed signals. In addition,
our modelling strategy allows us to study issues which have not been considered
so far.
1For the case of direct cross-ownership, Claessens et al. (1998) document the fact that other
companies (non-a¢ liated) constitute one of the most important blockholders in the corporate
ownership in various Asian countries. For the case of indirect cross-ownership, Hansen and
Lott (1996) report that the portfolios held by institutional investors in the U.S. include shares
in competing rms in some markets like the computer industry and the automobile industry.
Similarly, Brunello et al. (2001) and Becht and Roell (1999) describe how the pyramidal groups
are a very frequent structure for corporate ownership in Italy, France and Belgium.
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Our approach is a normative one, instead of a positive one, which has been the
focus of most of the previous literature. In general, this literature compares some
standard auctions in terms of the expected revenue that they yield. As mentioned
before, the main conclusion is that the revenue equivalence breaks down in the
presence of horizontal crossholdings.2 In contrast, we do not assume the existence
of a particular auction format for exogenous reasons, but characterize how the
maximizing expected revenue mechanism should be and how this mechanism could
be implemented.
One of the few papers that is normative as ours is that of Chillemi (2005). He
characterizes the optimal selling mechanism in the presence of horizontal crossh-
oldings, when bidders have positive and symmetric toeholds. His results show
that the optimal mechanism is such that the sellers expected revenue is increas-
ing in the common degree of crossholdings since she can extract a higher surplus
from the loser bidder. Our work generalizes these results, as we allow for two
types of agents: bidders with asymmetric toeholds and bidders without toeholds.
The presence of these bidders results in an optimal allocation rule with a double
bias. Firstly, among bidders with positive crossholdings, the optimal mechanism
discriminates against the bidder with the highest crossholding; and secondly, this
mechanism discriminates in a larger degree against the bidder without crosshold-
ing. We conclude that this procedure is such that the sellers expected revenue is
increasing not only in the size of a common crossholding, but also in the degree
of asymmetry of these toeholds.
Consequently, when we make endogenous the biddersdecision about buying/selling
crossholdings, we nd that their best decision is to transfer no ownership at all.
That is, ex ante identical bidders will prefer to keep this symmetry in order to avoid
the discrimination policy imposed by the optimal allocation rule. A similar con-
clusion emerges when we compare this optimal non-transference of crossholdings
with two joint bidding strategies: an illegal bid rigging and a legal consortium.
In that case, we show that when the seller can design an optimal mechanism as a
reaction to these agreements between bidders, the latter will also prefer to remain
as symmetric players whenever the informational advantage of collusion generated
by its opacity disappears.
Our results concerning the bias against the stronger bidders are analogous to
those of the literature about optimal auctions with bidders asymmetrically in-
formed (Povel and Singh (2004) and Povel and Singh (2005)). For instance,
Povel and Singh (2005) analyze the case of takeover contests with a general value
2See Chillemi (2005) and Ettinger (2002) for private values; and Dasgupta and Tsui (2004)
for private and interdependent values.
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model that allows a private and a common value environment. They characterize
the optimal selling procedure that a target company should design when it faces
outside bidders (without vertical toeholds) who are asymmetrically informed, and
also conclude as to the optimality of discriminating against the strongest bidder.
Similarly, in this paper we nd that in the presence of horizontal crossholdings, the
optimal mechanism also imposes a heavier discrimination policy on the stronger
players of the game. In our model, the strength of each bidder is given by a
stochastic comparative advantage resultant from the degree in which each bid-
der appropriates of his own surplus. The asymmetric cross-ownership structure
here assumed is therefore, a central element in explaining the properties of the
optimal discrimination allocation rule, and in particular, the monotonicity of its
biases with respect to the ranking of advantaged bidders. As did Povel and Singh
(2005), we also prove that the optimal mechanism may also be implemented by a
two-stage procedure. In the rst stage, the seller invites the stronger bidders to
participate in a second stage, in a modied rst price auction with personalized
reserve prices. If both of them reject participation, the object is awarded to
the weakest bidder via an exclusive deal for a price which he will always accept.
Otherwise, a modied rst price auction takes place with the accepting bidders
(which will always include the weakest bidder), where the discrimination policy is
implemented through a price-preferences scheme.
A central property of the optimal mechanism is that it has to be able to balance out
two opposite e¤ects on sellers revenues properly. Since the discrimination policy
induces the stronger bidders with high signals to reveal the truth, this enables the
seller to extract more value from these bidders and thus, increase her expected
revenue. However, this incentive devise is based on a threat with potential costs
in terms of e¢ ciency (and thus in terms of creation of value) if it had to be
materialized. If the signals of the stronger bidder(s) are not su¢ ciently high so
as to meet the more demanding requirements of the discrimination policy, the
seller will have to carry out this threat and assign the object to a weaker bidder,
with the risk that his value be smaller than those of the excluded bidder(s). In
consequence, the sellers revenue may decrease due to a less ex post creation of
value. Notice that it is analogous to the reserve price practice, although here the
negative e¤ect on decreasing the creation of value is less severe. This is because
the eventual cost of the threat is only to sell the object to a bidder with a smaller
value than the excluded bidder, but with a value larger than the sellers one. In
contrast, with a reserve price, the object is withdrawn from the auction and is
kept in the sellers hands, which in our model always will be worse in terms of
created value.
Finally, it is shown that a more simple sequential negotiation mechanism, although
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suboptimal, yields a larger sellers expected revenue than both the rst-price and
the second-price auctions. This nding is explained by the fact that this pro-
cedure considers exclusive deals with a timing that gives priority to the stronger
bidders, as an attempt to extract surplus selectively, and thus, to replicate the
main property of the optimal mechanism.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 constructs a model
of auctions with horizontal crossholdings. Section 3 characterizes and discusses
the properties of the optimal selling mechanism from the sellers viewpoint. The
e¤ects of this procedure on the biddersparticipation strategies are analyzed in
the next section. The implementation of the optimal mechanism via auctions and
negotiations is examined in Section 5. Conclusions and extensions are discussed
in Section 6. All the proof are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We have a seller who wants to sell a single object to one of three risk-neutral
bidders. The value of the object to bidder i is ti, which is private information,
but the seller and the other bidders know that it is independently and identically
distributed according to the c.d.f. F with support

t; t

, density f and hazard
rate H(ti) = f(ti)=(1 F (ti)).3 Denote by t0 the sellers value, which is assumed
common knowledge and normalized to zero.
A horizontal crossholding of bidder i is dened as a partial participation of this
bidder in another bidders surplus, and we suppose the following ownership link
structure. Bidders 1 and 2 have crossholdings in each other, and bidder 3 has
no crossholdings in the other bidderssurplus. The parameter i represents the
share of bidder i in bidder js surplus, for all i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j. Thus, (1  j)
represents the participation of bidder i in his own surplus. Crossholdings are
assumed common knowledge, with 1=2 > 1  2  0. Finally, no ownership
links between bidders and the seller are considered.
It is worthy to make some remarks about the main assumptions of the model.
First, the adoption of the simplest valuation and information environment, i.e.
the independent private value framework, has the following justication. Since
we want to focus on the e¤ects generated by the asymmetry stemming only from
the di¤erent initial stakes held by each bidder, we abstract away from any other
sources of asymmetry such as those caused by the valuation and information
3We focus on the regular case, i.e., increasing hazard rates, as it is standard in auction theory.
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environment. Consequently, we assume identically distributed signals. For a
similar reason, we also work with private valuations instead of interdependent
ones. Since the presence of common values introduces an extra source of less
aggressive bidding behavior -a di¤erent one from that induced by crossholdings-,
we prefer to examine a simpler valuation setting in order to establish more clearly
the e¤ects of crossholdings on the optimal mechanism.4
Second, although at rst glance, our modelling strategy regarding the number of
bidders and the ownership structure seems to be very ad hoc, it indeed allows us
to analyze, in a very simple way, matters which have not been considered so far by
the received literature. In fact, the scarce literature with a normative approach
as our work (e.g. Chillemi (2005)) characterizes the optimal selling procedure
when bidders possess positive and symmetric stakes in their rivals. In contrast,
our model generalizes this analysis, as it considers two types of agents: bidders
with asymmetric crossholdings and bidders without crossholdings. We shall see
that these novelties concerning the ownership structure are crucial to attaining
two remarkable results: to obtain an optimal discriminatory allocation rule and
to identify properly the source and nature of the biases imposed by such a policy.
3 The Optimal Selling Mechanism
We restrict our attention to a special class of mechanisms: the direct revelation
mechanisms. Denote by t the vector of signals realizations, i.e., t = (t1; t2; t3),
with support T . Similarly, denote by t i the vector of signal realizations of all
bidders except bidder i and T i its corresponding support. Let pi(t) be the
probability with which the optimal mechanism allocates the object to bidder i,
given the vector of reported signal realizations t, and let xi(t) be the payment
from bidder i to the seller. Let Qi(ti) be bidder is conditional probability of
winning given that he observes ti, i.e., Qi(ti) 
R
T i
pi(ti; t i)f(t i)dt i. Bidder
is expected payo¤, conditional on signal ti and announcement bti, is then given
by5
Ui(bti=ti)  Z
T i
[(1  j)(tipi   xi) + i(tjpj   xj)] f(t i)dt i
4Although we recognize, of course, the importance of characterizing this mechanism under a
richer environment, this constitutes an extension of our basic model that should be the aim of
future works.
5For simplicity, we have omitted the arguments of pi and xi, such that pi = pi(bti; t i) and
xi = xi(bti; t i), for all i.
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for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j, and
U3(bt3=t3)  Z
T 3
[t3p3   x3] f(t 3)dt 3
for all ti;bti 2 t; t, i = 1; 2; 3. We dene the truthtelling payo¤ as Vi(ti) 
Ui(ti=ti) and the sellers expected revenue when all bidders tell the truth as
U0 
3X
i=1
Z
T
xi(t)f(t)dt
Following Myerson (1981) (see details in the Appendix), we can rewrite the sellers
expected payo¤ as
U0 =
3X
i=1

 Vi(t) +
Z
T
ci(ti)pi(t)f(t)dt

(1)
where ci(ti), bidder is marginal revenue, is dened as6
ci(ti) 
(
ti   (1  j) 1H(ti) for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j
t3   1H(t3) otherwise
Hence, the optimal mechanism solves the following problem:
max
pi;Vi(t)
U0
s:t:
Vi(t)  0; for all i (2)
Q0i(ti)  0 for all ti 2

t; t

and for all i. (3)
3X
i=1
pi(t)  1 and pi(t)  0, for all i and for all t 2 T (4)
where (2) is a su¢ cient condition for bidder is participation constraint, (3) is one
of the two su¢ cient conditions for the incentive compatibility constraints of the
6See Bulow and Roberts (1989) for an interpretation of the bidder is marginal revenue
concept.
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bidders and (4) corresponds to the feasibility constraints. Notice that when there
exist crossholdings, the biddersreservation utilities are no longer exogenous. The
reason for this is the fact that now what a bidder with positive crossholdings can
get when refusing to participate in the auction depends on the rule used to as-
sign the object among the active bidders. The seller will then take advantage of
this phenomenon by designing an alternative mechanism that induces the partic-
ipation constraint that maximizes her expected revenues. This can be attained
by means of an optimal threat that allows us to nd the minimum reservation
utility of a bidder with crossholdings such that he prefers to participate in the
auction. Given our ownership structure, this optimal threat consists of selling for
sure the object to the bidder without crossholdings (bidder 3) whenever a bidder
with crossholdings (either bidders 1 or 2) decides not to participate in the auc-
tion.7 Notice that such a threat constitutes the maximum punishment against
the nonparticipating bidder. In fact, the execution of the threat implies that the
seller fully appropriates the nonparticipating surplus stemming from the crossh-
oldings and thus, all bidders exhibit the same zero reservation utility. Notice
nally that the commitment capacity of the seller is critical to the successful of
the procedure, especially because of the materialization of the threat may not be
ex post optimal.8
3.1 Optimal allocation rule
Lemma 3.1 The optimal mechanism sets Vi(t) = 0 and
pi(t) =

1 if ci(ti) > max f0;maxj 6=i cj(tj)g
0 otherwise
for all i, and for all t 2 T .
7This result is formally derived in the Appendix A.
8The endogenous nature of the reservation utilities and its consequences for the participa-
tion constraints can also have other sources. For instance, Jehiel, Moldavanu and Stacchetti
(1996, 1999) indentify a similar phenomenon when there are auctions with externalities between
bidders. They show that a revenue maximazing procedure in this context has to include an
optimal threat that induces bidders to participate in the auction by guaranting to the critical
type (the lowest type in our case) the lowest possible reservation utility. Consequently, if the
externalities are negative, the seller will threat with selling for sure to the bidder who imposes
the worst damage to the nonparticipating bidder. In contrast, if the externalities are positive,
the optimal threat implies that the seller keeps the object.
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Notice that bidder is marginal revenue is higher than bidder js if and only if
ti > zij(tj)  c 1i (cj(tj)) for all i 6= j. Likewise, we dene ti  c 1i (0) as the
threshold signal for which bidder is marginal revenue is higher than the sellers.
Then, since ci and its inverse function are well-behaved, it is equivalent to say
that the optimal mechanism sets Vi(t) = 0 and
pi(t) =

1 if ti > max fti ;maxj 6=i zij(tj)g
0 otherwise
(5)
for all i, and for all t 2 T .
3.2 Properties of the optimal mechanism
With horizontal crossholdings, the optimal rule implies a discriminatory policy as
zij(tj) 6= tj.9 By analyzing the properties of the functions zij, one can characterize
the nature of the biases involved in the optimal mechanism and nd out under
which circumstances it is revenue maximizing to sell the object to each bidder.
This is the content of the next lemma.
Lemma 3.2 The discriminatory policy functions zij have the following properties:
(i) The functions z3j(tj) and z12(t2) are strictly increasing in tj and t2, respec-
tively.
(ii) The functions z13(t3), z23(t3) and z21(t1) are non-decreasing in t3 and t1,
respectively.
(iii) At t1 = t2 = t3 = t, z32(t) > z31(t) > t, z12(t) > z13(t) = t, and z21(t) =
z23(t) = t.
(iv) For all zij(tj), there exists a unique signal tj =  > t such that zij() = ,
which is  = t.
(v) z32(t) > z31(t) > t, z12(t) > t  z13(t); and z23(t)  z21(t)  t, for all t < t.
Lemma 3.2 describes two properties of the optimal mechanism. First, it points
out that at the optimal mechanism all bidders must experience some degree of
9The analysis here is analogous to McAfee and McMillan (1989). They introduce the concept
of an optimal discriminatory function in the context of an asymmetric procurement when a
government faces domestic and foreign rms with di¤erent comparative advantages in costs.
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discrimination when facing another rival, either a positive or a negative one. Sec-
ond, for bidders 3 and 1 there exist a non-zero probability interval of signals with
which these bidders lose no matter the signal of their opponents. We discuss now
the intuition and implications of these properties.
Bias against the bidder with the highest crossholding. Among the bidders
with ownership links, the optimal mechanism is biased against the bidder with the
highest crossholding, because he wins the object only if his signal is su¢ ciently
higher than the signal of the other bidder with crossholding. For instance, if
t1 and t2 are uniformly distributed in the interval

t; t

, for bidder 1 to win it is
needed that t1 > z12(t2) = (1   2)t2 + 2t > t2, where 2  (1   2)=(2   2);
0 < 2 < 1=2. The intuition of this bias is that the bidder with the higher
crossholding exhibits a larger appropriability of his own surplus, which gives him
an informational advantage over his rival with the smaller crossholding.10 Thus,
bidder 1 is the strong player that has more incentives to under-report signals. The
optimal mechanism then encourages this bidder to reveal high signals by imposing
a discriminatory policy against him.11
Bias against the bidder without crossholding. In order to compare the
treatment given by the optimal selling mechanism to bidders with and with-
out ownership links, assume that the three bidders receive the same signal, i.e.,
t1 = t2 = t3 = t. It is easy to check that z32(t) > z31(t) > t for all t,12 which
implies that the optimal mechanism imposes a bias against the bidder without
crossholding, because his probability of winning against the bidders with crossh-
oldings is zero when all of them receive the same signal. The intuition behind this
bias is that this bidder exhibits a complete appropriability of his own surplus, and
thus, he is the most advantaged player of this game in terms of some informational
measure. Since bidder 3 has the largest incentives to under-report high signals,
the seller has to force him to tell the truth reducing his winning probability to the
largest extent if he reports low signals. Hence, the seller will be more demanding
with bidder 3 than any of his rivals when awarding the object.13
10Formalization of this intuition in terms of stochastic dominance is provided later on.
11An alternative explanation is that the bidder with the higher crossholding enjoys the higher
losing surplus, and thus, has more incentives to under-report signals. In line with this inter-
pretation, the seller could extract more losing bidders surplus from him. Nevertheless, this
interpretation no longer holds when we consider the bias imposed against the bidder without
crossholding.
12Or equivalently, c2(t) > c1(t) > c3(t):
13An alternative interpretation is that bidder 3 does not face counter-value incentives because
he does not have crossholdings at all. In consequence, he can adopt a less aggressive bidding
behavior and still defeat his rivals.
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Exclusion of su¢ ciently low signals. Notice that for su¢ ciently low signal
reports, the probability of winning for bidder 1 and bidder 3 is null: since z12 and
z3j are strictly increasing functions, if t1 < z12(t) then p1(t) = 0 and if t3 < z3j(t)
then p3(t) = 0. For instance, when the signals are uniformly distributed in the
interval

t; t

, we have that z12(t) = (1  2)t+ 2t and z3j(t) = (1  j)t+ jt,
where j  i=2, 0 < j < 1=4, and i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j. It is clear that these upper
bounds are higher than t, which means that the probability that some types of
bidders 1 and 3 lose for sure is positive. However, notice that these upper bounds
are not larger than t, which implies that the optimal mechanism does not exclude
completely any of these two bidders; it only ignores reported signals that are
su¢ ciently low, and encourages them to reveal high ones (and thus to pay high
transfers).
Monotonicity of the bias. The optimal rule sets the following ranking of
favored bidders (in descending order): (1) the bidder with the smallest (positive)
crossholding, i.e., bidder 2, (2) the bidder with the highest crossholding, i.e., bidder
1, and (3) the bidder without crossholdings, i.e., bidder 3. Notice that there is
an apparent non-monotonicity in the discrimination introduced by the optimal
rule, as this ranking is not monotonic with the ranking of bidderscrossholdings.
The next proposition shows however that indeed one can identify a monotonic
relationship between the degree of bias against each bidder and their level of some
stochastic advantage in the game.
Proposition 3.1 At the optimal mechanism, it is veried that:
(i) The larger the proportion of own surplus appropriated by bidder i, the higher
the stochastic advantage of this bidder in terms of hazard rate dominance.
(ii) As a consequence of (i), the larger the proportion of own surplus appropriated
by bidder i, the heavier the discriminatory policy imposed against him.
The proof of Proposition 3.1 points out that bidder i will be favored against bidder
j if and only if the modied distribution function of his valuations is hazard rate
dominated by the modied distribution function of his rivals valuations. This
means that the higher the stochastic advantage of a bidder, the higher the degree
of negative discrimination that the optimal mechanism imposes on this bidder.
This interpretation of the problem allow us to restate the standard result that in
an asymmetric auction the optimal rule is such that the stronger bidders are more
discriminated against. Since in our model, the source of this stochastic asymmetry
between bidders is the proportion of their own surplus that they retain, this implies
that the optimal mechanism establishes a scheme of biases that is indeed increasing
with that proportion.
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Extraction versus creation of value. A central property of the optimal
mechanism is that it induces a trade-o¤ for the seller between extraction and
creation of value. On the one hand, the discrimination policy encourages the
stronger bidders with high signals to reveal the truth. This enables the seller
to extract more value from these bidders and so, increase her expected revenue.
On the other hand, this incentive devise is based on a threat with potential costs
in terms of e¢ ciency (and thus in terms of creation of value) whenever it has to
be materialized. If the signals of the less favored bidder(s) are not su¢ ciently
high to meet the more demanding requirements of the discrimination policy, the
seller will have to execute this threat and to award the object to another bidder,
with the risk that his value be smaller than that of the excluded bidder(s). In
consequence, the seller revenues may decrease due to a less ex post creation of
value. The optimal mechanism must therefore balance out these two opposite
e¤ects properly in order to maximize the sellers revenues. Notice that it has a
similar e¤ect to the reserve price practice, although here the negative e¤ect on
decreasing the creation of value is less severe. This is because the cost of the
threat is only to sell the object to a bidder with a smaller value than the excluded
bidder, but with a larger value than the sellers one. In contrast, with a reserve
price, the object is withdrawn from the auction and kept in the sellers hands,
which in our model is always a loss.
E¤ects on the sellers expected revenue. The optimal mechanism internal-
izes the fact that bidders with crossholdings want the object to be sold as they
also get a share of the winning surplus whenever they lose the auction and the
winner is di¤erent from the bidder without crossholdings, i.e., bidder 3. This
allows the seller to extract some of the surplus from losing bidders. Furthermore,
this mechanism is also sensitive to opportunities for strengthening the optimal
discrimination policy given by changes in the ownership structure. Two results
follow from these two phenomena. First, the seller increases her expected revenue
when the intensity of a common crossholding increases because both the losing
bidders surplus is higher and a more severe bias can be imposed against bidder
3 as the comparative stochastic advantage of this bidder increases. The next
proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 3.2 If the degree of crossholding is symmetric (1 = 2 =  > 0),
then the sellers expected revenue is increasing in the common degree of ownership
links.
Moreover, the seller also increases her expected revenue when the degree of asym-
metry in the crossholdings is higher because she can strengthen the discrimination
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policy against the bidder who appropriates his own surplus more, improving her
ability to extract surplus selectively from each bidder. This is the content of the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose that (1 + 2) is constant. Let us dene the degree of
asymmetry in crossholdings as   (1  2). Then the sellers expected revenue
is strictly increasing in this degree of asymmetry.
4 Biddersparticipation strategies
Whereas the last two propositions stress the positive e¤ect that crossholdings have
on the sellers expected revenues, they imply however opposite consequences from
the bidderspoint of view. In fact, as the game played by the seller and the bidders
constitutes a zero-sum game in expected terms, these two properties induce indeed
an extreme aversion toward crossholdings in bidders. Thus, if bidders without
crossholdings had the alternative to transfer minority stakes of ownership between
them in a previous stage to that in which the optimal procedure is implemented,
they would prefer to remain with the original ownership structure. This corner
solution for the case in which values are uniformly distributed in the unitary
interval is established in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that ti is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1] for
all i and consider a game with the following timing:
Stage 1. Two of the bidders (say bidders 1 and 2) can unilaterally choose a
couple (i; j) for i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j with i; j 2 [0; 1=2).
Stage 2. Each bidder observes a realization of his value ti and participates in an
auction which corresponds to the optimal mechanism described by Lemma 3.1.
Then the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is such that it is optimal
for these two bidders to choose (i ; 

j) = (0; 0).
The result of Proposition 4.1 means that when bidders know in advance that the
seller will design an optimal mechanism as a response to their ownership structure,
they will anticipate this behavior and will prefer to face a mechanism that provides
them with a symmetric treatment. That is, in order to avoid the biases imposed
by the optimal mechanism when two of the three bidders have crossholdings, they
will prefer to continue being symmetric players and thus, it will be optimal to
transfer no minority ownership between them.
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The next proposition compares this optimal non-transference of crossholdings
strategy with two joint bidding strategies: an illegal bidding ring and a legal
bidding consortium.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that ti is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1] for
all i = 1; 2; 3 and consider a game with the following timing:
Stage 1. The seller calls for bidders to participate in an auction mechanism
whose rules will be optimally designed in Stage 3.
Stage 2. Two of the bidders (say bidders 1 and 2) decide about three possible
participation strategies: (i) Forming an illegal, e¢ cient and equal prot-sharing
bidding ring (Sj1), (ii) Forming a legal, e¢ cient and equal prot-sharing bidding
consortium (Sj2), or (iii) Unilaterally choosing a couple (j; k) with j; k 2
[0; 1=2) (Sj3); for j; k = 1; 2, j 6= k.
Stage 3. The seller designs and implements the optimal selling mechanism
according to the observed biddersparticipation strategies.
Stage 4. Each bidder observes a realization of his value ti and participates in
the auction designed in the previous stage.
Then for bidder j = 1; 2, it is veried that
1. The bidder js ex-ante truthtelling payo¤s yield from each participation strategy
are ranked as follows: Vj(tj; S
j
1) > Vj(tj; S
j
3 ) > Vj(tj; S
j
2) with S
j
3 = (

j ; 

k)
= (0; 0).
2. The Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is such that it is optimal
for these two bidders to choose Sj1 if the illegal collusion can not be detected.
Otherwise, the optimal decision is Sj3 .
The illegal collusive practice dominates therefore the other strategies so long as
the ring is not discovered by the seller, as it allows its members to benet from an
informational advantage.14 Nevertheless, if this practice can be detected for sure
by the seller, she will internalize this asymmetry in the optimal mechanism design
stage. Notice that in that case the bidding ring becomes strategically equivalent
to the consortium as both of them generate the same informational asymmetry,
but the extra advantage given by the opacity of the rst collusive arrangement
vanishes. In consequence, bidders prefer to remain being symmetric players in
order to avoid a discriminatory policy against the stronger one (either the ring or
14Specically, since the relevant valuation for the e¢ cient ring is the maximum between t1
and t2, the rings valuation distribution function hazard-rate dominates the one of bidder 3.
14
the consortium). As shown in Proposition 4.1, the optimal strategy for bidders
in that case is the absolute non-transference of crossholdings.15
5 How to sell? Auctions vs. Negotiations
In this section we state two results regarding the implementation of the optimal
selling mechanism. First, we show that the optimal allocation rule can be im-
plemented using a sequential procedure based mainly on non-standard auctions.16
Second, as to put this auction-based mechanism into practice may be too much
complicated, we propose a simpler procedure based on sequential negotiations,
which, although suboptimal, replicates the main properties of the optimal one.
5.1 The auction-based selling procedure
Our claim is that the properties of the optimal mechanism can be replicated by
the following sequential procedure:
Stage I: Call for strong bidders and a (possible) exclusive deal.
Seller invites the strong bidders (3 and 1) to participate in a rst-price auction
(FPA) with personalized reserve prices b3 and b1, respectively. If both bidders
reject participating, the object is o¤ered exclusively to bidder 2 at a price b2 such
that he will never reject the deal.
Stage II: Competitive bidding process with the accepting bidders.
In this stage, we may have three cases:
II.1. If in Stage I both bidder 1 and bidder 3 are willing to participate, there
is a modied FPA between all bidders such that bidder i wins if and only if
bi > maxj 6=ifzij(bj) and loses otherwise. The functions fzij correspond to price-
preferences that this modied auction introduces in order to replicate the optimal
discrimination policy represented by the functions zij described in the previous
section. Notice that thanks to the revelation principle, the optimal allocation rule
is expressed in terms of signals which in practice are not observed by the seller.
Thus, the price-preferences play the role of translating the optimal discrimination
15This can also happen if the illegal nature of the ring deters the biddersparticipation.
16For the sake of simplicity, to nd such an optimal mechanism we assume that t is su¢ ciently
high such that tH(t)  1. This implies that it will never be revenue maximinzing for the seller
to set a reserve price, and therefore, she always will assign the object to some bidder.
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policy to a procedure based on biddersinformation actually observed by the seller,
which are the bids.17
II.2. If in Stage I only bidder 3 accepts participation, there is a modied FPA
between bidder 3 and bidder 2 such that bidder 3 wins if and only if b3 > fz32(b2)
and bidder 2 wins otherwise.
II.3. If in Stage I only bidder 1 accepts participation, there is a modied FPA
between bidder 1 and bidder 2 such that bidder 1 wins if and only if b1 > fz12(b2)
and bidder 2 wins otherwise.
We call this process a modied FPA not only because of the presence of person-
alized reserve prices, but also because the price-preferences fzij imply that nally
the winner may not be the bidder who submits the highest bid.
The optimal participation and bidding strategies of each bidder and for each stage
are stated in the Appendix (see Lemma 8.1), where a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of this sequential mechanism is fully characterized. The following proposition
shows that the mechanism proposed in fact implements the optimal one as it
satises two conditions: (i) the lowest type bidder gets his reservation payo¤,
and (ii) the implicit allocation rule coincides with the optimal one.
Proposition 5.1 The sequential selling procedure is optimal.
5.2 The negotiation-based selling procedure
Given the potential complications of putting the auction mechanism suggested
into practice, it would be interesting to analyze whether another more simple pro-
cedure, although suboptimal, may replicate some of the properties of the optimal
one. Furthermore, it would be useful to compare this alternative mechanism
with some of the auction formats most used in the real world. In line with that
analysis, we show that indeed a more simple sequential negotiation procedure
generates higher expected revenue for the seller than both the FPA and the SPA.
The following proposition illustrates this result with two bidders and uniformly
distributed valuations.
Proposition 5.2 Suppose that ti is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1] for
all i = 1; 2, and 1 > 2 > 0. Then, consider the following sequential procedure:
17McAfee and McMillan (1989) also analyze the implementation of the optimal discrimination
policy through price-preferences in a model of asymmetric government procurements.
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Stage I: Negotiation with bidder 1.
I.1. The seller makes a take it-or-leave it o¤er 1 to bidder 1.
I.2. Bidder 1 observes a realization of his signal t1 and accepts or rejects this
o¤er. If he accepts, the object is sold to him and the game ends.
Stage II: Negotiation with bidder 2.
II.1. If bidder 1 rejects the deal, the seller makes a new take it-or-leave it o¤er
2 to bidder 2.
II.2 Bidder 2 observes a realization of his signal t2 and accepts or rejects this
o¤er. If he accepts, the object is sold to him. Otherwise, the object is kept by
the seller.
Then,
1. The Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is such that it is optimal
for the seller to set 1 > 

2.
2. At the equilibrium, this mechanism yields a larger sellers expected revenue
than both the FPA and the SPA.
The intuition behind this last nding is straightforward. Since the procedure
proposed has a negotiation timing that gives priority to bidders according to
their own surplus appropriated, it replicates the main property of the optimal
mechanism: to impose a discriminatory policy against the stronger bidders.
From the practical point of view, the sequential procedure exhibits realistic prop-
erties, as it is frequent the use of rounds of exclusive and preferential negotiations
to sell some items. This situation is especially present in the takeover contests,
in which the target rm (the board of directors or a special committee) negotiates
sequentially and exclusively with the possible raiders. In general, the timetable of
these negotiations favors the buyer who is considered the strongest one because of
some advantage like a better knowledge of the rm (for instance, a management
buy-out), a participation in the targets ownership (a toehold), or something else.
This implies that in the real world the seller is indeed able to commit to the rules
of the mechanism, even though this may be ine¢ cient ex post. As Povel and Singh
(2006) document for the takeover battles, there exists plenty of protection devices
aimed to mitigate the opportunistic behavior from the seller and thus, to sustain
the deal that had been done previously.18
18Some of these deal protection devices are termination fees, lock-up clauses and poison pills.
Recent cases include the sale of the Norwegian Tandberg Television, and the takeover battle
for the Spanish tollway operator Europistas. In both cases, the target paid a compensation
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6 Concluding Remarks
We characterize the optimal selling mechanism in the presence of horizontal crossh-
oldings, in a setting with independent private values and independently distrib-
uted signals. In this environment, the strength of each bidder is given by a
stochastic comparative advantage resultant from the degree in which each bidder
appropriates from his own surplus. The asymmetric cross-ownership structure
here assumed is therefore, a central element to explain the properties of the opti-
mal allocation rule. In particular, this asymmetry is crucial to the fact that this
procedure discriminates against both the bidder with the highest crossholding and
the bidder without crossholding, with the last bias being the most severe.
Furthermore, at the optimal mechanism the sellers expected revenue is increasing
not only in the size of a common crossholding, but also in the degree of asymmetry
of these crossholdings. These results have two di¤erent consequences for the
participants in the auction. For the seller, this implies that she will benet from
larger cross-ownership links as it is possible to extract more surplus from the losing
bidders whenever he is a bidder with crossholdings, and improve the selectivity of
the discriminatory policy as crossholdings become more asymmetric. From the
bidderspoint of view, the main implication is that when we make endogenous
their decision about buying/selling crossholdings, we nd that their best decision
is to transfer no ownership between them. One of the possible interpretations of
this result is that the crossholdings observed in practical auctions are consequence
of the fact that the mechanism used by the seller is di¤erent from the optimal
one. It is likely that for simplicity, regulation issues or from ignorance, the seller
decides to apply a standard auction, which in contrast to the optimal mechanism
can benet (hurt) the bidders (seller) as the cross-ownership links are higher.
We show that the optimal allocation rule may be implemented by a sequential pro-
cedure that includes a price-preferences scheme and the possibility of an exclusive
deal with the weakest bidder. This selling procedure counterbalances properly
two opposite e¤ects on the sellers revenues, which arise from the trade-o¤between
extraction and creation of value induced by the optimal mechanism. Interest-
ingly, it is also found that another more simple sequential negotiation procedure,
although suboptimal, replicates the main property of the optimal mechanism and
dominates the rst-price and the second-price auctions in terms of sellers rev-
for revoking a previous exclusive deal in favor of a subsequent buyer. The termination fees
were USD 18 million and e 131 million, respectively (see El País, Negocios, November 19,
2006, p. 3; El Economista, August 9, 2006; Tanderberg Television Recommends Ericssons
O¤er, http://www.tanderbergtv.com/newsview.ink?newsid=398; Atlanta Business Chronicle,
February 26, 2007, http://atlanta.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2007/daily1.html).
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enues.
The analysis performed in this paper can be extended, at least, in two directions.
First, a natural issue is how the properties of the optimal mechanism could change
when more complex valuation and information environments are considered, espe-
cially due to the extra source of less aggressive bidding behavior introduced by the
winners curse phenomenon. Finally, since the e¤ects induced by vertical crossh-
oldings on the aggressiveness of bidders are opposite those provoked by horizontal
crossholdings, nding out what is the optimal selling mechanism in that case also
seems to be a relevant extension.
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8 Appendix
Appendix A: The optimal mechanism problem.
The optimal mechanism solves the following problem:
max
xi2R; pi2[0;1]; 'i2[0;1]2
U0 (6)
s:t:
Vi(ti)  'iui 8ti 2

t; t

; i = 1; 2; 3 (7)
Vi(ti)  Ui(bti=ti) 8ti; bti 2 t; t ; i = 1; 2; 3 (8)
3X
i=1
pi(t)  1 and pi(t)  0; i = 1; 2; 3;8t 2 T (9)
where (6) is the sellers expected revenue, (7) and (8) represent bidderspartic-
ipation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints, respectively, and (9)
corresponds to the feasibility constraints. First, notice that since there exist
crossholdings, the original participation constraints consider endogenous reserva-
tion utilities that depends on the allocation rule adopted by the seller in case
of non-participation of one bidder. This rule is represented by 'i = ('ij; '
i
k),
the vector of probabilities with which the seller assigns the object to bidder j or
20
bidder k if bidder i does not participate in the auction. Similarly, ui = (uj i; uki)
represents the vector of outside opportunity utilities of bidder i when bidder j
or bidder k gets the object. Given the cross-ownership structure assumed, it
is clear that u21 > u31, u12 > u32 and u13 = u23. Hence, it must be opti-
mal that '1 = ('12; '
1
3) = (0; 1) and '
2 = ('21; '
2
3) = (0; 1). As we normalize
u3
1 = u3
2 = u1
3 = u2
3 = 0, all of this implies that the zero reservation utility for
all bidders is optimal as well.
Second, following Myerson (1981), it is possible to show that the incentive com-
patibility constraints are satised if and only if
(i) @Vi(ti)
@ti
=

(1  j)Qi(ti) if j,i > 0
Qi(ti) if j,i = 0
for i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j
(ii) @V3(t3)
@t3
= Q3(t3)
(iii) @Qi(ti)
@ti
 0 for all i.
Using these conditions, straightforward computations allow us to rewrite the
sellers expected payo¤ and to simplify the maximization problem as presented
in Section 3.
Appendix B: Proofs.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Clearly from (1), it is in the sellers interest to make
Vi(t) = 0 for all i because Vi(t) > 0 is suboptimal and setting Vi(t) < 0 violates the
Participation Constraint. On the other hand, H 0(ti) > 0 implies c0i(ti) > 0 and
thus @pi(t)
@ti
 0 , so that Q0i(ti)  0 is satised for all i. Finally, since t0 = 0, the
optimal allocation rule is found by comparing for a given t = (t1; t2; t3) the terms
c1(t1), c2(t2) and c3(t3) whenever they are positive. The solution sets pi(t) = 1
i¤ ci(ti) > max f0;maxj 6=i cj(tj)g :
Proof of Lemma 3.2. (i) We only show the claim for z31; the remaining cases
are similar and hence omitted. Notice that by denition, z31(t1)  c 13 (c1(t1)).
Then, z031(t1) = c
 10
3 (c1(t1))c
0
1(t1) > 0 follows from the fact that both ci and its
inverse are strictly increasing functions for all i.
(iii) By denition, z12(t)  c 11 (c2(t)) > c 11 (c3(t))  z13(t), where the inequality
follows from the fact that c2(t) > c3(t) and the inverse of c1 is a strictly increasing
function. Notice, however, that z13(t)  c 11 (c3(t)) < c 11 (c1(t)) = t, which is not
possible and so, we must impose a truncation such that we dene
21
z13(t3) =

t if t  t3 < z31(t)
c 11 (c3(t3)) otherwise
Using the same arguments, we can verify that the other cases also hold, which
includes the following denition for bidder 2
z2j(tj) =

t if t  tj < zj2(t)
c 12 (cj(tj)) otherwise
, for all j 6= 2
(ii) According to the denitions of the discrimination policy functions provided in
the proof of (iii), and using the same arguments applied in (i), the desired result
follows directly.
(iv) The claim is only proved for z31. First, from (iii) we know that z31(t) > t.
Second, notice that z31(t)  c 13 (c1(t)) = t, where the last equality follows from
the fact that c1(t) = c3(t). Since z31 is a strictly increasing function, all of that
implies that z31 has a unique xed point  = t:
(v) This is a direct consequence of results (i)-(iv).
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Let us dene Ji(ti)  H(ti)si , the modied hazard rate
of bidder is value distribution function, where si is the proportion in which bidder
i appropriates his own surplus, i.e., s1 = 1  2, s2 = 1  1 and s3 = 1. Denote
by Gi its corresponding c.d.f.. Since ci(t) is increasing with t then zij(t) T t i¤
ci(t) S ci(zij(t)) = cj(t), where the last equality follows from the implicit denition
of zij. It is easy to check that this inequality is equivalent to Jj(t) R Ji(t) for all
t, and for all i 6= j, which means that zij(t) < t i¤ Gj HRD Gi (i.e., Gj hazard
rate dominates Gi). Since s3 > s1 > s2 implies that G3 HRD G1 HRD G2, the
desired result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. From (1), when 1 = 2 =  > 0, we obtain that
@U0
@
=
P2
i=1
R
T
h
1
H(ti)
i
pi(t)f(t)dt  0 because H(ti) > 0 and pi(t)  0 for all t
and i.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Given some 1 and 2, from conditions (i)-(iii) of
Appendix A and Lemma 3.1, the sellers expected revenue evaluated according to
the optimal mechanism is given by
V 0 =
2X
i=1
i6=j
Z
T
[(1  j)tipi(t) + itjpj(t)] f(t)dt+
Z
T
t3p3(t)f(t)dt
 
2X
i=1
i6=j
(1  j)
Z t
t
Z ti
t
Qi(si)dsif(ti)dti  
Z t
t
Z t3
t
Q3(s3)ds3f(t3)dt3
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Consider an increase and a decrease of " in 1 and 2 respectively, with 0 < " < 2.
Then, the sellers expected revenue if the ownership link parameters are e1 = 1+"
and e2 = 2   ", but she follows the optimal allocation rule for 1 and 2, can be
reduced to
V
e
0 = V

0 + "
Z t
t
Z u
t
[Q2(s) Q1(s)] dsf(u)du (10)
where Qi(s) = Pr(tj < zji(s)) Pr(ti < s) for i; j = 1; 2 i 6= j. Note that
t1 > t

2 implies that Pr(t

2 < s)  Pr(t1 < s), and from Lemma 3.2 it follows that
F (z21(s)) < F (z12(s))) for all s 2

t; t

. All of that implies that Q1(s)  Q2(s)
for a given signal s. As long as the exclusion of both bidders is not possible for all
s, the last result implies from (10) that V e0 > V 0 . That is, the expected revenue
can become larger as asymmetry increases, without changing the allocation rule.
Therefore, the seller may additionally increase her expected revenue by switching
to the optimal allocation rule.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Applying backward induction, rstly we have to nd
the Nash equilibrium of Stage 2. Since we know this equilibrium from Lemma 3.1
and the fact that the optimal mechanism induces a truthtelling biddersstrategy
via the incentive compatibility constraint, we only concentrate on the Nash equi-
librium of the complete game. To this end, we previously need to characterize
the objective function for bidder i = 1,2 in Stage 1, using the equilibrium of Stage
2. From the denition of Qi(si), conditions (i)-(iii) of Appendix A and Lemma
3.1, we obtain that when ti is uniformly distributed in the unitary interval, the
truthtelling payo¤ is given by Vi(ti) = (1   j)
R
T i
[ti   zi(t i)] 1ftizi(t i)gdt i
where
zi(t i) = inf fsi : ci(si)  0 and ci(si)  cj(tj) for all j 6= ig
= max

ti ; (1  j)tj + j;
t3
1  i
  i
1  i

for i 6= j
is the inmum of all winning values for i against t i and ti =
1 j
2 j , with j
and i dened as in Section 3. After integrating, we obtain the truthtelling
payo¤ of bidder i at the interim state. For the sake of presentation, we omit this
expression here, but we represent it using the generic function vi(ti; i; j) for the
term
R
T i
[ti   zi(t i)] dt i as follows:
Vi(ti; i; j) = (1  j)[vi(ti; i; j)1fti>zi(t i)=tig
+ vi(ti; i; j)1fti>zi(t i)=(1 j)tj+jg
+ vi(ti; i; j)1fti>zi(t i)=t3=(1 i) i=(1 i)g]
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Taking expectation with respect to ti, we get the ex-ante truthtelling payo¤ for
bidder i, which we summarize as:19
Vi(i; j)  EtiVi(ti; i; j) =
Z 1
ti=ti
Vi(ti; i; j)
Hence, at Stage 1 bidder i has to solve the following program:
max
(i;j)
Vi(i; j)
s:t:
0  i < 1=2
0  j < 1=2
for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j. Finally, we can check that @Vi(i;j)
@i
< 0 and @Vi(i;j)
@j
< 0
for all i; j 2 [0; 1=2). This implies that this program has only a corner solution
such that i = 

j = 0, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Applying backward induction, rstly we need to
characterize the BNE resulting from Stage 4 for the two possible optimal selling
mechanisms that can be implemented in Stage 3. Since these mechanisms satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraint it will be in the best interest of the bidders
to follow a truthtelling strategy. Then, we characterize the possible optimal
mechanisms in Stage 3.
First, if bidders 1 and 2 decide to form an e¢ cient consortium, the seller will
design a mechanism taking into account that the relevant valuation for the coali-
tion is tC = max ft1; t2g. Since the consortiums value distribution hazard-
rate dominates the bidder 3s, the seller will design an optimal auction with
asymmetric bidders so that it will impose a bias against the strongest player
of the game, i.e., the consortium. Following the same methodology in Proof of
Proposition 3.4, we obtain that the consortiums truthtelling payo¤ is given by
Vc(tc) =
R
t3
[tc   zc(t3)] 1ftczc(t3)gdt3 where20
zc(t3) = max
(r
1
3
;
2t3   1
2
+
2
p
t3(t3   1) + 1
3
)
19The explicit expressions of Vi(ti; i; j) and Vi(i; j) are available on request.
20Notice that c 1c (c3(t3)) =
2t3 1
2 
2
p
t3(t3 1)+1
3 . For the computations, we only consider
the positive root.
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After integrating, the consortiums truthtelling payo¤ at the interim state is given
by
Vc(tc) =

tc   0:67601 if tc  zc(t3)
0 otherwise
.
and the ex-ante consortiums truthtelling payo¤ is EtcVc(tc) = 0:08769. Under the
equal prot-sharing rule, each partner of the consortium gets in expected terms
Vj(tj; S
2
j )  12EtcVc(tc) = 0:043845.
Second, if bidders 1 and 2 decide to form an e¢ cient (but illegal) bidding ring,
the seller (and also bidder 3) is not aware of the existence of this coalition when
designing the optimal mechanism. In particular, whereas the seller believes that
she faces three symmetric bidders, the ring has an informational advantage sim-
ilar to the consortium case because its relevant valuation is tR = max ft1; t2g.
Thus, the seller incorrectly designs a standard optimal mechanism with symmet-
ric bidders (Myerson (1981)). Assuming that this procedure is implemented by
a second-price auction with a reserve price, the rings truthtelling payo¤ is given
by
VR(tR) =
Z
t3
[tRpR(tR; t3)  xR(tR; t3)] 1ftRzR(t3)gdt3
where zR(t3) = max

1
2
; t3
	
,
pR(tR; t3) =

1 if tR  zR(t3)
0 otherwise
and xR(tR; t3) =

zR(t3) if pR(tR; t3) = 1
0 otherwise
The rings truthtelling payo¤ at the interim state is then given by
VR(tR) =
(
t2R
2
  1
8
if tR  zR(t3)
0 otherwise
and its corresponding ex-ante truthtelling payo¤ is EtRVR(tR) = 0:140625. Each
member of the ring obtains then, in expected terms, Vj(tj; S1j )  12EtRVR(tR) =
0:0703125.
Third, from Proposition 3.4 we know that both bidders optimally choose zero
crossholdings when deciding about the transfer of crossholdings between them,
such that Sj3 = (

j ; 

k) = (0; 0) for j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k. Thus, the seller
now correctly designs a standard optimal mechanism with symmetric bidders.
In that case, each bidder gets Vi(ti) =
R
T i
[ti   zi(t i)] 1ftizi(t i)gdt i where
zi(t i) = max f1=2;maxj 6=i tjg. The bidder is truthtelling payo¤ at the interim
state becomes
25
Vi(ti) =

t3i
3
  1
24
if ti  zi(t i)
0 otherwise
.
and its corresponding ex-ante truthtelling payo¤is given by Vi(ti; Si3 )  EtiVi(ti) =
0:05729166. We can therefore establish the following ranking for bidders 1 and
2: Vj(tj; S
j
1) > Vj(tj; S
j
3 ) > Vj(tj; S
j
2).
Hence, it follows directly that at the participation decision stage (Stage 2) these
two bidders prefer the strategy Sj1 whether the existence of the bidding ring is
unknown by the seller, as the coalition can take advantage of the informational
asymmetry. However, if the ring can be discovered with certainty, the bidding
rings strategy becomes, from a bidders viewpoint, similar to the consortium
strategy. In that case, it is clear from the ex-ante truthelling payo¤s that the
zero crossholding strategy dominates both joint bidding practices.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. We need previously to state the next auxiliary
result.
Lemma 8.1 A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the sequential procedure is the fol-
lowing one:
Bidder 3strategy. Accept participation in Stage II if and only if t3  z32(t);
and in Stage II bid:
bII.13 (t3) = E [max fz32(t2); z31(t1)g jmax fz12(t2); t1g < z13(t3)]
and
bII.23 (t3) = E [z32(t2)jt2 < z23(t3)]
Bidder 1strategy. Accept participation in Stage II if and only if t1  z12(t);
and in Stage II bid:
bII.11 (t1) = E

max

z12(t2) 1t2
1 1 ; z13(t3)

jmax ft2; z23(t3)g < z21(t1)

and
bII.31 (t1) = E

z12(t2) 1t2
1 1 jt2 < z21(t1)

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Bidder 2strategy. Accept the o¤er to pay b2 in Stage I; and in Stage II bid:21
bII.12 (t2) =
tL(t)
L(t2)
+ E

max

z21(t1) 2t1
1 2 ; z23(t3)

jmax ft1; z13(t3)g < z12(t2)

bII.22 (t2) =
tF (z32(t))
F (z32(t2))
+ E [z23(t3)jt3 < z32(t2)]
bII.32 (t2) =
tL1(t)
L1(t2)
+ E

z21(t1) 2t1
1 2 jt1 2 [z12(t); z12(t2)]

where i  i1 j for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j. These are equilibrium strategies if the seller
designs a modied FPA with the following characteristics:
b3 = z32(t)
b1 = z12(t)
b2 such that  2(t) = 0fzij(b) = bi(zij(b 1j (b)))
where  i(:) represents the bidder is expected truthtelling payo¤ (i.e. the average
across all stages) in this sequential mechanism.
Proof of Lemma 8.1. We only demonstrate that these candidate bidding
functions constitute an equilibrium for the most general case: bidder 1. Dene:
bk1(t1), the candidate bidding function for bidder 1 in Stage k, as follows
bk1(t1) =
8<:
bII:11 (t1) if t1 > z12(t) and t3 > z32(t) (Stage II.1)
bII:31 (t1) if t1 > z12(t) and t3 < z32(t) (Stage II.3)
0 otherwise (Stage II.2 or Stage I)
qki (ti; t i) as the probability that bidder i gets the object in Stage k,
k1(bt1=t1), bidder 1s expected payo¤ in Stage k when he observes t1, but plays
the strategy as if his signal were bt1, as follows
Z
T 1

(1  2)

t1   bk1(bt1) qk1(bt1; t 1) + 1 t2   bk2(t2) qk2(bt1; t 1)	 f(t 1)dt 1
21Notice that L(t) = F 1 2(z12(t))F (z32(t)) and L1(t) = F 1 2(z12(t)):
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 k1(t1)  k1(t1=t1), bidder 1s truthtelling payo¤ in Stage k, and
P k1 (t1) 
R
T 1
qk1(t1; t 1)f(t 1)dt 1, bidder 1s probability of winning in Stage k,
conditional on the realization t1.
Let us organize this proof in two steps.
Step 1. Notice that the payo¤ function  k1 corresponds to the particular case of
the truthtelling payo¤ function V1 dened in Section 3 when the optimal payment
is x1(t1; t 1) = bk1(t1) and the optimal allocation rule is p1(t1; t 1) = q
k
1(t1; t 1).
22
It follows then directly from conditions (i) and (iii) of Appendix A that the in-
centive compatibility constraint  k1(t1)  k1(bt1=t1) for all t1; bt1 2 t; t and k, is
satised if @ 
k
1(t1)
@t1
= (1  2)P k1 (t1) and @P
k
1 (t1)
@t1
 0 for all k.
Step 2. We show now that the strategy bk1(t1) satises these two su¢ cient
conditions and therefore is an equilibrium bidding strategy of this game. First,
notice that bk1(t1) is increasing for stages II.1 and II.3 and, since by constructionfzji implements the optimal allocation rule, we have that
P k1 (t1) =
8<:
F (z21(t1))F (z31(t1)) if t1 > z12(t) and t3 > z32(t) (Stage II.1)
F (z21(t1)) if t1 > z12(t) and t3 < z32(t) (Stage II.3)
0 otherwise (Stage II.2 or Stage I)
(11)
Notice that @P
k
1 (t1)
@t1
 0 is satised both for each stage and across stages, as by
assumption f(zi1(t1)) > 0, F (zi1(t1)) > 0 and by Lemma 3.2 z0i1(t1) > 0, for all
t1 > z12(t). We prove now that the second su¢ cient condition also holds. If t1 >
z12(t) and t3 > z32(t) (Stage II.1), it can be checked after some computations that
@ II:11 (t1)
@t1
= (1 2)F (z21(t1))F (z31(t1)) = (1 2)P k1 (t1), where the second equality
follows from (11). Using the same argument, a similar result holds for Stage II.3.
Finally, when t1 < z12(t), bidder 1 does not participate in the auction. Noting
that z21(t1) = t for all t1 < z12(t), we can verify that
@ k1(t1)
@t1
= 0 = (1  2)P k1 (t1),
where the second equality follows from (11), which completes the proof.
We are now prepared to demonstrate Proposition 5.1.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. From Lemma 3.1, we know that a selling procedure is
optimal if it satises two conditions: (1) the bidder with the lowest possible signal
realization gets his reservation payo¤ (which in Appendix A we have showed to
be optimally the same for all bidders and normalized to zero), and (2) it uses
22In particular, notice that since bki (t1) = 0 when q
k
i (ti; t i) = 0, we can factorize the surplus
of bidder 1 and 2 in terms of qki (ti; t i).
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the optimal allocation rule. Notice that by construction, the sequential selling
procedure satises both conditions. First, the payo¤ for either bidder with signal
t is zero: (i) bidder 3 does not participate in Stage II (because z32(t) > t)
and thus, he gets  k3(t) = 0 for all stage k; (ii) bidder 2 loses the auction for
sure if some other bidder agrees to participate in Stage II and thus, he has a
positive expected payo¤. Otherwise, he pays b2 in the exclusive deal, which by
construction, guarantees that the average payo¤ across all stages in the sequential
mechanism for the lowest-type is  2(t) = 0; and (iii) bidder 1 neither participates
in Stage II (because z12(t) > t), and result (ii) also ensures that he gets in expected
terms (as average across all stages)  1(t) = 0. Second, the allocation rule is the
optimal one as we can check that bi > fzij(bj) i¤ ti > zij(tj) using the denition offzij(:).
Proof of Proposition 5.2. Applying backward induction, rstly we need to
characterize the NE resulting from Stage II. In this stage, bidder 2 accepts the
o¤er if (1   1)(t2   2) > 0, i.e., if t2 > 2, and rejects otherwise. The seller
therefore has to optimally choose the o¤er given by 2 = argmax2(1   2)2.
After solving, we get that 2 = 1=2 and the optimal sellers expected revenue
from this stage is equal to 1=4.
In Stage I, bidder 1 accepts any sellers o¤er if his payo¤ is larger than the ex-
pected payo¤ at the equilibrium of stage II. That is, if (1   2)(t1   1) >
Et2 [1(t2   2)] = 1=8, which is equivalent to the condition t1 > 1+1=8(1 2).
Thus, the sellers optimal o¤er is characterized by
1 = argmax
1

(1  (1 +
1
8(1  2)))1 + (1 +
1
8(1  2))
1
4

The solution is given by 1 = 5=8  1=16(1  2), which yields an optimal sellers
expected revenue equal to (100  (12  ))=256, where   1=(1  2). Hence,
and since  < 1, it is easy to verify that 1 > 

2, which proves the rst statement
of the proposition.
In order to show the second result, notice that in the presence of asymmetric
crossholdings it is not possible to nd an analytical expression for the equilibrium
bidding strategy in both FPA and SPA, and thereby, it is neither possible to
obtain a closed expression for the sellers revenue (see Section 5, Dasgupta and
Tsui (2004)). Notice however that we can perform a comparison with both
FPA and SPA without crossholdings, which yield a larger expected revenue than
their versions with crossholdings due to the fact that these ownership links hurt
the seller (see Proposition 1 and Section 4, Chillemi (2005)). So, it is enough to
show that the expected revenue of the sequential mechanism proposed exceeds the
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expected revenue for both FPA and SPA without crossholdings, which thanks to
the Revenue Equivalence Theorem is the same for both auction formats and equal
to 1=3. Since  < 1, the worst case for our sequential negotiation mechanism
is when  ! 1, in which case the expected revenue for the seller converges to
89=256 > 1=3, implying that the second part of the proposition holds.
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